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## Case

## Spec

#### ‘The’ means all parts, that means that when included in the plantext we mandate changes to each branch and every antitrust law. Solves all their offense because we link to every DA

Merriam-Webster's Online Collegiate Dictionary, 5

http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary

the 4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

## K

#### Perm do both – Popular sovereignty is key to communism – Marx argued in favor of making democratic institutions more responsive to the demands of the proletariat­

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Bruno Leipold, “Marx’s Social Republic: Radical Republicanism and the Political Institutions of Socialism,” *Radical Republicanism: Recovering the Tradition’s Popular Heritage*, Eds. Bruno Leipold, Karma Nabulsi, and Stuart White, Oxford University Press 2020, pp. 176-181.

1. Popular Delegacy and Representative Government

At the outbreak of the Commune, authority over Paris first passed into the hands of the Central Committee of the National Guard, an autonomous and democratic body that had emerged the month before in the turbulent aftermath of the Prussian siege of Paris. Marx enthusiastically described the Central Committee’s federative system of electing its members (from companies and battalions upwards) and claimed that ‘Never were elections more sifted, never delegates fuller representing the masses from which they had sprung’.22 Marx extended this praise to the electoral mechanisms of the Commune Council (subsequently shortened to simply Commune), which assumed control from the Central Committee after elections on 26 March 1871. Marx argued that these measures, comprising imperative mandates, representative recall, and short terms of office, transformed an unaccountable system where representatives ruled over the people to one where delegates were subordinated to their oversight and control. As he says in The Civil War in France, ‘[i]nstead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes’.23

The institutional mechanisms that Marx embraces to constrain representatives (or delegates) conflict with one of the core principles of representative government, which holds, as Bernard Manin identifies in his authoritative account of the topic, that representatives retain partial independence from the will of the people who elected them.24 That is, once representatives are elected, they are not required to vote in accordance with the preferences of their constituents and can instead decide on legislation based on their own judgment. At the same time, Manin points out, representatives are not entirely independent of their constituents either, as they are subject to both citizen pressure during their mandate and the threat of not being re-elected at the end of their mandate. This means that representatives have both an incentive to act in accordance with their constituents’ preferences, but are not legally required to do so, giving them a certain degree of discretion. Manin outlines several constitutional mechanisms that can reduce the degree of this discretion, focusing particularly on imperative mandates and the right to recall representatives. Imperative mandates (often referred to by their French name, mandat impératif ), require representatives to carry out the instructions given to them by their constituents. The right to recall allows constituents to sanction representatives immediately rather than at the end of their mandate. Both measures thereby constrain the discretion of representatives. They have however been almost universally absent from or even explicitly banned by the constitutions of representative governments. Manin writes, ‘None of the representative governments established since the end of the eighteenth century has authorized imperative mandates. . .Neither has any of them durably applied permanent revocability of representatives.’25 In France, the imperative mandate has been expressly prohibited in all of its republican constitutions (with the exception of the never implemented 1793 Jacobin Constitution and the 1946 Constitution of the ill-fated Fourth Republic), and similar provisions can be found in the modern constitutions of countries as diverse as Germany, Korea, Senegal, and Spain.26

There was however a long radical republican tradition, from the French Revolution to the Paris Commune, which, inspired by Rousseau, contested this ultimately victorious model of largely unconstrained representation.27 Across the various republican constitutional moments we find the more radical elements of the tradition voicing a more accountable and delegative understanding of representation. One of the Revolution’s key radical participants, Jean-Paul Marat, had already advised the English people in 1774 that ‘representatives of the people ought ever to act according to the instructions of their constituents’ otherwise What then are our representatives, but our masters?’28 When deputies assembled in the Estates General in 1789 they carried instructions (Cahiers) from their constituencies, which were almost immediately declared void in response to the aristocratic Second Estate’s attempt to use them to block the early constitutional process of the Revolution, and the imperative mandate was subsequently banned in the 1791 Constitution. However, as the Revolution progressed various radical groupings, including the sans-culottes, concluded that this had resulted in the ‘establishment of an unrestrained power’ which had replaced the king’s despotism with ‘legislative tyranny’, and they thus waged a campaign to legalize the imperative mandate, having some success with the Jacobin Constitution of 1793, which also included a provision for representative recall.29 These more radical ideas on representation surfaced once again with the Commune, with Commune members citing the mandat impératif given to them by their constituents in the justification of their votes.30 Even after the Commune’s demise, radical republicans waged an unsuccessful campaign for imperative mandates to be included in the constitution of the Third Republic.31 They argued that the choice for the French people lay between the ‘imperative mandate or carte blanche to our mandatories, masters or slaves, this is the alternative; nothing in between, you must choose’.32

Marx inherited this tradition of radical constitutionalism, and we find its influence expressed in his endorsement of imperative mandates and the right to recall representatives, as well as short terms of office, in his defence of the Commune. The Commune is praised for having its members ‘chosen by universal suffrage . . .responsible and revocable at short terms’, as well as its proposed plans for local and regional communes to send delegates to a national body where ‘each delegate [would] be at any time revocable and bound by the mandat impératif (formal instructions) of his constituents’.33 Marx also expresses distaste for representatives previously having ‘three or six years. . .to misrepresent the people’ and constituents only being able to replace them ‘once in many years’.34 This preference for short terms of office is also expressed in an 1852 article on the Chartists, where Marx voices his support for their demand for annual general elections (the only one of their six demands that remains unfulfilled today), noting that it was one ‘of the conditions without which Universal Suffrage would be illusory for the working class’.35

Marx does not dedicate much space to considering exactly how these electoral mechanisms would ensure greater democratic accountability. But he does make an intriguing comparison between voters choosing representatives and employers hiring workers. He comments that ‘universal suffrage . . .[will] serve the people’ just ‘as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and managers in his business’.36 Marx continues the comparison by claiming that it is ‘well known’ that both individual citizens and employers have the ‘know how to put the right man in the right place’, but if they do ‘make a mistake’ they have the power to ‘address it promptly’.37 The ironic point being that just as employers can fire their employees as they please, so the people will be able to recall its representatives as it pleases. The implication of this comparison is that similarly to how workers are currently tied to the will of their employers, so representatives will be tied to the will of their electors. For if a representative diverges from the preferences of the constituents, the constituents can ‘promptly’ rectify their mistake by immediately recalling their representative, rather than having to wait for the end of the representative’s mandate to vote them out office. The representative can thus be expected to tailor their behaviour, just as a worker does, to ensuring that the constituents do not try to recall them.

The outcome of the accountability mechanisms that Marx endorses would mean the transformation of representative government into a system of popular delegacy. In the former, representation is understood as the ceding of decision-making power by the people to representatives and the people’s role reduced to deciding whether to renew or decline their mandate at the next election. In between elections, representatives exercise their mandate with a large degree of discretion and without the formal involvement of the people. In a system of popular delegacy, representation is instead understood as a form of commission, where representatives (or delegates) implement the wishes of their constituents. The people also retain the continuous power to intervene in the decision making of their representatives by giving them formal instructions or recalling them entirely. Through the institutions of popular delegacy, Marx thought that universal suffrage would be turned from a tool to choose between elite representatives, to one where the people remain firmly in possession of political power. That point is vividly made in the first draft of The Civil War in France, where Marx argues,

The general suffrage, till now abused either for the parliamentary sanction of the Holy State Power, or a play in the hands of the ruling classes, only employed by the people to choose the instruments of parliamentary class rule once in many years, adapted to its real purposes, to choose by the communes their own functionaries of administration and initiation.38

Marx’s critique of representative government in his discussion of the Paris Commune is prefigured in some of his early political writings, particularly in his criticisms of Hegel in his Zur Kritik des Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie (Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 1843). Hegel had rejected ‘commissioned or mandated agents’ because he believed that representatives had a ‘better understanding’ of the common good than the people who elected them.39 Marx countered that unencumbered representatives ‘in reality represent particular interests’ and without the formal constraints of imperative mandates, representatives stop being delegates of the people, commenting that ‘Formally they are commissioned, but once they are actually commissioned they are no longer mandatories. They are supposed to be delegates, and they are not.’40 Marx further objected to how representative government reduced political participation, a ‘single and temporary’ event, to a ‘sensational act, [that] it is political society at a moment of ecstasy’.41

As several commentators have noticed, Marx’s critique of reducing the people’s involvement in politics to merely choosing who is to lead them every few years and his endorsement of an alternative system of popular delegacy bears a striking resemblance to Rousseau.42 Rousseau famously argued in Du contrat social (On the Social Contract, 1762) that representative government amounted to slavery punctuated by momentary freedom during elections. The English people were thus ‘free only during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved, it is nothing’.43 Rousseau’s criticism of representation has often given rise to the interpretation that he thinks freedom is only realizable in small city-states where every citizen can participate directly and representation is unnecessary. But in his Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne (Considerations on the Government of Poland, 1772) Rousseau suggests that liberty and large modern states can in fact be reconciled. He argues that the inevitable corruption of legislators in a representative system can be avoided by two mechanisms: holding frequent elections and requiring legislators to ‘adhere exactly to their instructions’.44 Rousseau argues that without these preventative measures the legislature becomes the ‘instrument of servitude’.45 He thus observes of the unencumbered English system of representation,

I can only marvel at the negligence, the carelessness, and I dare say the stupidity of the English Nation, which after arming its deputies with the supreme power, adds not a single restraint to regulate the use they might make of it during the entire seven years of their mandate.46

Marx and Rousseau thus both share a commitment to imperative mandates and frequent elections as constitutional mechanisms to keeping representatives accountable to the people who elected them. (The similarity between Marx and Rousseau on this question is not surprising, given that in the same summer that the young Marx wrote his critique of Hegel he read and took notes on Rousseau’s Du contrat social).47 Both Marx and Rousseau turn to popular delegacy as a way to realize democracy and popular sovereignty in a large modern polity, without resorting to the largely unconstrained form of representation that has today become exclusively identified with ‘democracy’. Defenders of representative government have, in contrast, tended to present their preferred regime as the only alternative to Athenian-style direct democracy and since (they maintain) we cannot go back to these small city-states, representative government wins by default. Marx and Rousseau’s advocacy of popular delegacy shows that these poles do not exhaust the possibilities for realizing democracy in a modern state.

#### Anti-domination frame is more consistent with Marx’s writings – we should read Marx as arguing against domination rather than inequality

Roberts 17 – Associate professor of political science at McGill University,

William Clare Roberts, interviewed by C. J. Polychroniou, “Dismantling Domination: What We Can Learn About Freedom from Karl Marx,” *Truthout*, 4 May 2017, https://truthout.org/articles/dismantling-domination-what-we-can-learn-about-freedom-from-karl-marx/.

William Clare Roberts: I would say it a bit differently. Marx is certainly concerned with equality. Everyone on the left is. The question is: equality of what? This is where freedom, or liberty, comes in. In my book, I argue that Marx shared the radical republican project of securing universal equal freedom. When we talk about equality on the left today, this is too often assumed to mean equality of material wealth or equality of treatment, such that economic equality is the goal in itself. For Marx, economic inequality was not the main problem. It was a consequence and a breeding ground of domination. This was Marx’s prime concern.

To be dominated is to be subject to the whims or caprice of others, to have no control over whether or not they interfere with you, your life, your actions, your body. Republicans, going back to the Roman republic, have recognized that this lack of control over how others treat you is, of itself, inimical to human flourishing. [According to their philosophy], whether or not the powerful actually hurt you is actually less important than the fact that they have the power to hurt you, and you can’t control whether or not or how they use that power. It is in this space of uncertainty and fear that power does its work. So, for example, that an employer can fire a worker at will is usually enough to secure the worker’s obedience, especially where the worker doesn’t have many alternative sources of income. Likewise, that the police have the basically unchecked power to arrest, beat and harass people in many neighborhoods produces all manner of distortions in how people live, regardless of whether they have actually been beaten or harassed. To live free is to live without this fear or this need to watch out for the powerful. And this means being equally empowered.

Traditionally, republicans were concerned only to protect the freedom of a certain class of men within their own political community. In the 19th century, however, workers, women, escaped slaves — people who lived with domination — began to take over this republican theory of freedom and to insist that everyone should enjoy equal freedom. I read Marx as part of this tradition.

Marx’s major innovation in this tradition was to develop a theory of the capitalist economy as a system of domination. Radicals then — like many radicals today — assimilated capital to previous forms of power — military, feudal, or extortionary. They saw the capitalist simply as a monopolist, and the government as the enforcement squad of the monopolists. To Marx, this was insufficient as a critical diagnosis. The capitalists are, like the workers, dependent upon the market. They must act as they do or be replaced by other, more effective capitalists. Marx saw in this market dependence a new sort of all-round social domination. The livelihood of each depends upon the unpredictable and uncontrollable decisions of many others. This impersonal domination mediates and transforms the other forms of domination people experience.

#### Antitrust is good – it’s a critical tool for reformulating economic structures to meet the alt’s goals

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Anthony Pahnke, “The Revolutionary Potential of Food Sovereignty: Applying Lenin’s Insights on Dialectics, the State, and Political Action,” Rethinking Marxism, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/08935696.2021.1935551

Where theorists of radical democracy have trouble working with sovereignty and the state, Lenin sees their capacity to forge a transformative political project. In discussions of food sovereignty, Lenin’s insights are relevant to engaging the state to initiate revolutionary transformations concerning private property, public policy, and territory. When considering these issues in movement debates, Lenin’s work speaks to general questions of mobilization and strategy.

Lenin’s discussions on socializing property and the state are insightful when considering the nature of private property in its relation to food sovereignty. For Lenin, not merely redistribution is paramount but also the eventual abolition of private property. The direct-action practices of social movements such as the Brazilian Landless Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, or MST), which engages in land occupations to demand agrarian reform (Stronzake and Wolford 2016), can be promoted in this regard. Specifically, acquiring and then redistributing large plantations or farms to individuals or families is a way to democratically redistribute surplus product and/or revenue. Occupations are critical, but the point is that they can lead to positive alternative forms of community that aim to promote collective, democratic forms of territorial control. Moreover, central questions on territory need not revolve around access or ownership but may instead focus on how its use leads to more direct-producer control and surplus distribution.

Promoting public policies also cannot be dismissed from discussions of strategy within food-sovereignty debates. In this regard, some researchers note how new laws in the United States have freed farmers from governmental oversight and regulation (Bellinger and Fakhri 2013). Where food has been declared a right—for instance, when food sovereignty was enshrined in the Ecuadorian constitution of 200810—state agencies, legislative committees, and nongovernmental organizations have sought to promote local food systems (Peña 2016). On a more limited scale in the United States, the Outreach and Technical Assistance for Socially Disadvantaged and Veteran Farmers and Ranchers Program attempts to provide historically marginalized farmers with technical assistance and subsidized loans. Again, if activists dismiss the state outright, then engagement with such policies—perhaps even how to expand them or take them over to build alternatives—is omitted.

Another potential policy is the use of antitrust legislation in the United States. Organizations such as the NFFC have listed such efforts, especially demands around the need for governments to address price fixing and corporate power, among its central pillars.11 While often considered a way to break up large firms in order to help small ones—in effect, to save capitalism from itself12—challenging agribusiness firms can also lead to innovative new reorganizations of economics. Lenin would encourage activists not to forget the state in confronting corporations. Private property and the capitalist state are necessarily related, particularly when we understand the state as a relation of forces that promote certain systems of ownership. Antitrust promotion is a possible way to challenge such systems by directly targeting firms. This would check—not necessarily abolish—private property by limiting the ability for owners to appropriate and distribute surplus as they see fit. And while breaking up large firms into smaller ones is a possibility through antitrust legal action, promoting state intervention can also potentially grant movements the chance to redistribute assets and resources so that they can be governed democratically. In this way, actively promoting antitrust actions can make private property part of a process of constructing alternative economic relationships.

#### ONLY the aff has a sustainable strategy of countering concentrated power – anarchism’s refusal to engage with the state ensures their revolution gets crushed

**Wainer and Bienenfeld 19** – Kit Wainer is a member of the United Federation of Teachers and is active in the opposition caucus, the Movement of Rank and File Educators. Mel Bienenfeld is a longtime socialist activist and recently retired president of a higher-education teachers local union.

(Kate Griffiths, 7-21-2019, "Problems with an Electoral Road to Socialism in the United States," New Politics, https://newpol.org/issue\_post/problems-with-an-electoral-road-to-socialism-in-the-united-states/)

Governors control the National Guard and state police. Local governments control local police forces, although the Constitution allows states full discretion to limit the autonomy of localities. While the president may federalize the guard for a period of time, it is easy to imagine guard generals refusing to obey presidential authority when asked to enforce decisions the courts have ruled unconstitutional. Of course a president can send the army into states, thus violating the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, but it is similarly easy to envision generals refusing to execute orders on solid constitutional grounds, or the officer corps dividing amongst itself, in that scenario. In short there would be no way of overcoming state recalcitrance to implement socialist legislation without destroying the legitimacy of the constitutional order.

In fact, not only can state authorities resist, they can also repress. Partial socialist victories in the electoral arena would inevitably yield a fractured state, with critical parts still in the hands of pro-capitalist officials. The latter would be constitutionally authorized to arrest and terrorize mass movement activists who threaten their rule. They have, after all, done so numerous times in U.S. history. Even today, federal and state authorities are far more likely to arrest someone for the crime of being an immigrant or person of color than for marching with an armed fascist gang threatening the annihilation of the Jews. Mass movements that are not prepared to physically confront and defeat armed authorities would stand little chance.

Bureaucracy, the Regulatory Process, and Unelected Authority

While the legislative and executive branches make law and the judicial branch reviews laws, unelected regulatory bodies determine how they are actually interpreted and implemented. Currently, these bodies are staffed by skilled bureaucrats through a combination of patronage, political favoritism, and civil service promotion. Regulatory agencies are typically staffed by and managed by the industries they are designed to regulate. Even lower-level bureaucratic posts often enable employees to audition for far more lucrative private-sector employment. This creates enormous incentives to defer to corporate prerogative, even if the elected authorities have a different agenda. And these regulatory agencies decide what the law means in day-to-day situations that lawmakers can never predict when writing bills.

Bureaucratic and regulatory agencies govern at the local, state, and federal levels. They set zoning policies that largely determine whether housing is affordable and safe for working-class habitation. Their rules indirectly affect how much of their lives working people spend commuting to and from work because where tall buildings are built often determines which neighborhoods are clogged with traffic. As with regulatory agencies, building departments are typically instruments of real estate developers, even if they do protect occupants’ safety to some extent. Unelected bodies, such as public authorities in New York and New Jersey, typically control public transportation and critical infrastructure, and an army of bureaucrats runs the education systems all over the United States. All of these bureaucratic agencies are susceptible to intense pressure from highly paid lobbyists. Conditions of housing, transportation, public health, and education are some of the most powerful forces shaping workers’ daily lives, and it is difficult to imagine how working people would maintain confidence in and enthusiasm for a workers’ government that could not demonstrably improve those aspects of their lives. It is also difficult to see how a government could make significant headway in those areas without breaking apart the relevant bureaucracies and busting up the private-sector lobbying firms that influence them. In short, the very precondition for sustained radical electoral success would require the demolition of most regulatory organizations and their replacement with democratic and accountable bodies.

Unelected bureaucracy also reigns in the area of foreign policy. While major decisions such as going to or avoiding war, or negotiating trade agreements, are in the hands of elected officials, many of the day-to-day details of foreign relations are decided and implemented by career officials who are similarly subjected to substantial corporate lobbying and use foreign service careers as springboards into highly paid private-sector employment. The State Department routinely approves international trade licenses, contacts foreign bureaucrats on behalf of U.S. firms, and utilizes personal relationships with international counterparts to smooth those processes. In a world in which several major capitalist states still rule and the U.S. state is fractured, these bureaucrats could become key links between global and domestic counter-revolution.

While bureaucracy takes different forms in different countries, career civil servants staff the state apparatus in most capitalist states today. They tend to be ideologically committed to the survival of the state. Their career ambitions also depend on the patronage of higher ups in each department and alliances with private capitalists who hold the key to their promotion both inside and outside the public sector.

Can bureaucracy be subordinated to a workers’ government? Yes. In fact the soviet state had no choice but to rely on sectors of the tsarist bureaucracy both to win the civil war and for government administration in the 1920s. In a scenario in which the capitalist class has been fully defeated, disempowered bureaucrats might well decide, one by one, that cooperation with the new workers’ regime represents the only hope for maintaining their careers. However, the “democratic,” or, more accurately, the electoral, road to socialism leads inevitably along a different path. It does not deliver a sudden, decisive defeat to the state or to the ruling class. Quite the contrary, it leads to what might be termed “dual power,” in which socialists rule over substantial sectors of the government but capitalist politicians dominate others and much of the capitalist state bureaucracy remains intact. The police, fearing that their careers are in jeopardy, would likely continue to repress mass movements and fight at all costs to preserve their positions. These institutions of the capitalist state would also have powerful allies in the judiciary, not to mention support from capitalists around the world. Under that scenario it is highly unlikely that the administrative bureaucracies would place themselves at the service of workers’ regimes who have far less to offer them and from whom they have far less to fear.

Throughout U.S. history the labor movement and other radical reform movements have had to contend with ferocious and violent counterattacks. After World War I, socialists, anarchists, and labor activists of various stripes faced intense state repression. The survival of U.S. capitalism was not in question at this time. Yet, the federal government responded with mass arrests, deportations, frame-ups, and violence. After World War II, federal and state governments effectively repressed the radical wings of the labor movement with witch hunts and blacklists, while tolerating rampant racist violence. It is important to note that the Communist Party not only, at this point, could not have threatened revolution, its orientation was heavily electoral. But the mere prospect of a more militant labor movement and a radical electoral alternative was something both Democrats and Republicans were determined to repress. In the 1960s the FBI’s Cointelpro program targeted movement activists and even murdered Black Panther leader Fred Hampton.

A workers movement in the United States must prepare for severe state repression or it will succumb to it. At times this may involve operating clandestinely. It may also require active self-defense against legal authorities or fascist paramilitaries. Most importantly, preparation means educating a generation of socialist and labor activists about how and why the state protects capitalist profitability both through its own constitutional mechanisms and often with repressive measures that violate its own legality.

#### State regulatory power is key to every impact – agencies need to be able to respond quickly to emerging risks

Bagley 19 – Professor of Law, UMich

Nicholas Bagley, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, ARTICLE: THE PROCEDURE FETISH, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 345 (December, 2019)

Because the world is changing at a breakneck clip, a bias toward inaction means that the state will respond too slowly as new risks present themselves and existing risks come into focus. Internet commerce, drones, social media, cellular phones, algorithmic trading, driverless cars, and artificial intelligence barely existed two decades ago; today, they are part (or are becoming part) of the fabric of our lives. We only dimly understand how to cope with the attendant risks to health, welfare, and privacy associated with these technological changes. At the same time, older risks have become more prominent, whether because of evolving scientific understanding (climate change, the waning efficacy of antibiotics), shifting patterns of industrial organization (the rise of monopoly power across multiple industries), or crises that exposed fragility in complex systems (the financial crisis, Hurricane Maria). An administrative apparatus that cannot adapt to a changing world threatens to become a relic of a bygone era. It also becomes easier to dismantle. Regulations adopted in a very different environment will come to look ill fitting and unresponsive to modern problems. Justifying their abandonment or relaxation is straightforward: the world really has changed. 118 Adopting a new rule and defending it against concerted attack, however, remains enormously difficult.

#### Specifically, warming – An approach that rejects state power to solve climate change is like slashing your tires before driving the Indy 500

Monbiot 8 – Political & environmental activist, recipient of the UN Global 500 Award for outstanding environmental achievement, author of several award-winning books on environmental crises and corporate capture in politics, reporter for The Guardian Neoliberalism.

George Monbiot, August 22 2008, “Climate change is not anarchy's football,” The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/aug/22/climatechange.kingsnorthclimatecamp

If you want a glimpse of how the movement against climate change could crumble faster than a summer snowflake, read Ewa Jasiewicz's article, published yesterday on Comment is free. It is a fine example of the identity politics that plagued direct action movements during the 1990s, and from which the new generation of activists has so far been mercifully free.

Jasiewicz rightly celebrates the leaderless, autonomous model of organising that has made this movement so effective. The two climate camps I have attended – this year and last – were among the most inspiring events I've ever witnessed. I am awed by the people who organised them, who managed to create, under extraordinary pressure, safe, functioning, delightful spaces in which we could debate the issues and plan the actions which thrust Heathrow and Kingsnorth into the public eye. Climate camp is a tribute to the anarchist politics that Jasiewicz supports.

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But in seeking to extrapolate from this experience to a wider social plan, she makes two grave errors. The first is to confuse ends and means. She claims to want to stop global warming, but she makes that task 100 times harder by rejecting all state and corporate solutions. It seems to me that what she really wants to do is to create an anarchist utopia, and to use climate change as an excuse to engineer it.

Stopping runaway climate change must take precedence over every other aim. Everyone in this movement knows that there is very little time: the window of opportunity in which we can prevent two degrees of warming is closing fast. We have to use all the resources we can lay hands on, and these must include both governments and corporations. Or perhaps she intends to build the installations required to turn the energy economy around – wind farms, wave machines, solar thermal plants in the Sahara, new grid connections and public transport systems – herself?

Her article is a terrifying example of the ability some people have to put politics first and facts second when confronting the greatest challenge humanity now faces. The facts are as follows. Runaway climate change is bearing down on us fast. We require a massive political and economic response to prevent it. Governments and corporations, whether we like it or not, currently control both money and power. Unless we manage to mobilise them, we stand a snowball's chance in climate hell of stopping the collapse of the biosphere. Jasiewicz would ignore all these inconvenient truths because they conflict with her politics.

"Changing our sources of energy without changing our sources of economic and political power", she asserts, "will not make a difference. Neither coal nor nuclear are the 'solution', we need a revolution." So before we are allowed to begin cutting greenhouse gas emissions, we must first overthrow all governments and corporations and replace them with autonomous communities of happy campers. All this must take place within a couple of months, as there is so little time in which we could prevent two degrees of warming. This is magical thinking of the most desperate kind. If I were an executive of E.ON or Exxon, I would be delighted by this political posturing, as it provides a marvellous distraction from our real aims.

To support her argument, Jasiewicz misrepresents what I said at climate camp. She claims that I "confessed not knowing where to turn next to solve the issues of how to generate the changes necessary to shift our sources of energy, production and consumption". I confessed nothing of the kind. In my book Heat, I spell out what is required to bring about a 90% cut in emissions by 2030. Instead I confessed that I don't know how to solve the problem of capitalism without resorting to totalitarianism.

The issue is that capitalism involves lending money at interest. If you lend at 5%, then one of two things must happen. Either the money supply must increase by 5%, or the velocity of circulation must increase by 5%. In either case, if this growth is not met by a concomitant increase in the supply of goods and services, it becomes inflationary and the system collapses. But a perpetual increase in the supply of goods and services will eventually destroy the biosphere. So how do we stall this process? Even when usurers were put to death and condemned to perpetual damnation, the practice couldn't be stamped out. Only the communist states managed it, through the extreme use of the state control Jasiewicz professes to hate. I don't yet have an answer to this conundrum. Does she?

Yes, let us fight both corporate power and the undemocratic tendencies of the state. Yes, let us try to crack the problem of capitalism and then fight for a different system. But let us not confuse this task with the immediate need to stop two degrees of warming, or allow it to interfere with the carbon cuts that have to begin now.

Jasiewicz's second grave error is to imagine that society could be turned into a giant climate camp. Anarchism is a great means of organising a self-elected community of like-minded people. It is a disastrous means of organising a planet. Most anarchists envisage their system as the means by which the oppressed can free themselves from persecution. But if everyone is to be free from the coercive power of the state, this must apply to the oppressors as well as the oppressed. The richest and most powerful communities on earth – be they geographical communities or communities of interest – will be as unrestrained by external forces as the poorest and weakest. As a friend of mine put it, "when the anarchist utopia arrives, the first thing that will happen is that every Daily Mail reader in the country will pick up a gun and go and kill the nearest hippy".

This is why, though both sides furiously deny it, the outcome of both market fundamentalism and anarchism, if applied universally, is identical. The anarchists' associate with the oppressed, the market fundamentalists with the oppressors. But by eliminating the state, both remove such restraints as prevent the strong from crushing the weak. Ours is not a choice between government and no government. It is a choice between government and the mafia.

Over the past year I have been working with groups of climate protesters who have changed my view of what could be achieved. Most of them are under 30, and they bring to this issue a clear-headedness and pragmatism that I have never encountered in direct action movements before. They are prepared to take extraordinary risks to try to defend the biosphere from the corporations, governments and social trends which threaten to make it uninhabitable. They do so for one reason only: that they love the world and fear for its future. It would be a tragedy if, through the efforts of people like Jasiewicz, they were to be diverted from this urgent task into the identity politics that have wrecked so many movements.

#### Strong admin state k2 health innovation – big pharma is blocking progress rn

**Mazzucato 21** – Professor in the Economics of Innovation and Public Value at University College London (UCL), where she is Founding Director of the UCL Institute for Innovation & Public Purpose (IIPP)

Mariana Mazzucato, “MISSION ECONOMY: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism,” Penguin Publisher, 1/28/21, https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/315/315191/mission-economy/9780241419731.html

A mission-oriented approach in the health sector, where services, therapies and diagnostics are crucial, is a particularly interesting concept because it allows us to look at how missions affect the way in which the public and private sectors produce together. That is, it moves us from policy to actual production. A mission-oriented approach to production means keeping an eye on the objective and governing the value chain to reach that objective. So in producing a vaccine, the mission objective might be that it is universally available and accessible. That will affect how the production and innovation itself is carried out and governed. It will include governance of the intellectual property rights, licensing agreements, and the types of collaborations between large pharmaceutical companies and public labs. Rethinking how to govern health innovation better is particularly relevant because health- innovation systems have long failed to address the world’s greatest needs and put public health first.

Health innovation is expensive, inefficient and unsustainable, while the pharmaceutical sector itself consistently puts profits before people. Largely, this is due to incentives which encourage pharmaceutical companies to set high prices and deliver short-term returns to shareholders instead of investing in riskier, long-term research that advances critical therapies. The high prices of medicines have prevented patients from using them worldwide, or have reduced access to them, with damaging consequences for human health and well-being. This is especially problematic given the very high public spending worldwide on drug innovation. In the USA alone, the National Institutes of Health spends $40 billion a year on it and yet drug prices do not reflect that, leading some to say – an idea we have encountered before – that while the costs are socialized, the profits are privatized.24

#### Solves extinction – viruses are becoming stronger and will cause global instability without stronger state responses

**Excler 21** – Head of Clinical Development and Regulatory at International Vaccine Institute in Seoul

Jean-Louis Excler, “Vaccine development for emerging infectious diseases,” Nature Medicine, April 2021, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-021-01301-0.pdf

Examination of the vaccine strategies and technical platforms used for the COVID-19 pandemic in the context of those used for previous emerging and reemerging infectious diseases and pandemics may offer some mutually beneficial lessons. The unprecedented scale and rapidity of dissemination of recent emerging infectious diseases pose new challenges for vaccine developers, regulators, health authorities and political constituencies. Vaccine manufacturing and distribution are complex and challenging. While speed is essential, clinical development to emergency use authorization and licensure, pharmacovigilance of vaccine safety and surveillance of virus variants are also critical. Access to vaccines and vaccination needs to be prioritized in low- and middle-income countries. The combination of these factors will weigh heavily on the ultimate success of efforts to bring the current and any future emerging infectious disease pandemics to a close.

Newly emerging and reemerging infectious viral diseases have threatened humanity throughout history. Several interlaced and synergistic factors including demographic trends and high-density urbanization, modernization favoring high mobility of people by all modes of transportation, large gatherings, altered human behaviors, environmental changes with modification of ecosystems and inadequate global public health mechanisms have accelerated both the emergence and spread of animal viruses as existential human threats. In 1918, at the time of the ‘Spanish flu’, the world population was estimated at 1.8 billion. It is projected to reach 9.9 billion by 2050, an increase of more than 25% from the current 2020 population of 7.8 billion (https://www.worldom- eters.info). The novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) responsible for the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic1–3 engulfed the entire world in less than 6 months, with high mortality in the elderly and those with associated comorbidities. The pandemic has severely disrupted the world economy. Short of lockdowns, the only means of control have been limited to series of mitigation measures such as self-distancing, wearing masks, travel restrictions and avoiding gatherings, all imperfect and constraining. Now with more than 100 million people infected and more than 2 million deaths, it seems that the addition of vaccine(s) to existing countermeasures holds the best hope for pandemic control. Taken together, these reasons compel researchers and policymakers to be vigilant, reexamine the approach to surveil- lance and management of emerging infectious disease threats, and revisit global mechanisms for the control of pandemic disease.

Emerging and reemerging infectious diseases

The appearance of new infectious diseases has been recognized for millennia, well before the discovery of causative infectious agents. Despite advances in development of countermeasures (diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines), world travel and increased global inter- dependence have added layers of complexity to containing these infectious diseases. Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) are threats to human health and global stability. A review of emerging pandemic diseases throughout history offers a perspective on the emergence and characteristics of coronavirus epidemics, with emphasis on the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic8,9. As human societies grow in size and complexity, an endless variety of opportunities is created for infectious agents to emerge into the unfilled ecologic niches we continue to create. To illustrate this constant vulnerability of populations to emerging and reemerging pathogens and their respective risks to rapidly evolve into devastating outbreaks and pandemics, a partial list of emerging viral infectious diseases that occurred between 1900 and 2020 is shown in Table 1.

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